Aim: The subject of the paper is to discuss the consequences of the changes in the legislation on mortgage loans in Swiss francs, proposed by the Polish Sejm in August 2015, to the situation in the banking sector and the economy. The topic is important because of the potential impact of such changes on Polish banking industry, and indirectly lower GDP growth rate.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to discuss the impact of legislative changes in the law on Swiss franc-denominated mortgage loans put forward by the Polish Sejm (the lower chamber of parliament) on the situation of the banking sector and the economy. The analysis focuses on the influence of the proposed changes on the situation of borrowers who have difficulties servicing their loans in foreign currencies. The author argues that the transfer of 50% to 90% of clients' costs related to CHF appreciation to PLN onto the banks would be a disproportionate move destabilizing the economy. The initial part of the paper sets forth the background for the increasing importance of foreign currency loans and their current position on the banks' balance sheets. Subsequently, the main postulates of the groups of "affected CHF borrowers" will be discussed along with legislative drafts on currency loans adopted by the parliament by the end of August. The third part analyses the consequences of proposed changes for the banks, the economy and the stock market. In conclusion, the author lays down his view on the proposed regulations and presents suggested changes that could eliminate some of their most harmful consequences.
Mortgage loans in Swiss francs in Poland
Mortgage loans in Swiss franc extended by Polish banks account for a significant portion of the loan portfolio -nearly 40% of all mortgage loans and 9% of all the bank assets (https://www.knf.gov.pl/opracowania/sektor_bankowy/dane_o_rynku/Dane_miesieczne.html, [31.07.2015] ). It is a significant amount, meaning that the quality of the loan portfolio affects banks' profits and the scale of the lending business. It is also high when compared to the countries where mortgage loans are not extended by "regular" banks using clients' deposits, but by the issuance of covered bonds (see chart 1).
The popularity of currency loans offered on mass scale in the period 2004-2009 was a consequence of higher creditworthiness of clients who borrowed in foreign currencies as opposed to PLN loans. The clients, attracted by the appreciation of PLN against the Swiss franc, often believed that the favourable exchange trend would continue throughout the period of the repayment of their liabilities, meaning that their instalments would get lower and lower. An abrupt appreciation of CHF changed the situation, resulting in difficulties in loan repayment faced by many clients and in increased banks' profits. Chart 2 presents the CHF exchange rate.  a loan is converted to PLN at the mean exchange rate of the National Bank of Poland from the date preceding the date of submission of the loan restructuring application;
 the bank redeems 50% of the principal amount of the mortgage loan in PLN which would be outstanding as of the date of the application if the borrower concluded a PLN-denominated loan with the same bank on the same date as he or she concluded the foreign-currency denominated loan with the repayment schedule arranged analogously as in the foreign-denominated mortgage loan;
 restructuring applies to mortgage loans in foreign currency for the purchase of a flat with the surface up to 75 sq. m or a single-family house with the surface up to 100 sq. m and the LtV 2 value of at least 80%.
These assumption underwent significant changes in the legislative process. As of September 2015, the draft act with Senate's amendments was based on the assumptions outlined above. However, the original draft prepared by the Sejm stipulated the redemption of as much as 90%, and not 50% of the principal amount and made restructuring available to a broader range of borrowers. It should be emphasized that the restructuring in the form adopted by the Senate would be available to the majority of borrowers making a currency loan extremely attractive as compared to the PLN mortgage loans extended at that time. It also applied to loans denominated in other foreign currencies apart from CHF, such as EUR. However, finally, Senate's amendments were not accepted by the Sejm before the end of the 7 th term of the parliament and the draft act did not come into force.
Economic consequences of proposed legislative changes
In this part of the paper economic consequences of the proposed changes concerning the loan currency conversion are discussed. First of all, pros and cons of these solutions are presented from the perspective of borrowers. The currency conversion would bring about the following benefits to borrowers who have incurred a CHF loan: a) lower value of loan instalments, b) elimination of volatility of the instalments to be repaid.
These factors are beneficial to substantially all borrowers who took out mortgage loans before the CHF/PLN rate collapsed in the second half of 2008 (see chart 2), though they do not eliminate the risk of insolvency or falling victim to a debt spiral. Nonetheless, it must be said that these benefits do not apply in any way to borrowers who took out loans in PLN, have been typically paying higher instalments than CHF borrowers and will not receive any additional compensation from the state. The benefits for the borrowers -quite numerous -who took out loans in EUR would be lower, as this currency did not appreciate as much as CHF did (see Chart 3).
Chart 3. EUR/PLN exchange rate in the period 2005-2015
Source: http://stooq.pl/q/?s=eurpln.
As shown in chart 3, in the period 2005-2007 one EUR corresponded on average to ca. The ratio of costs and benefits arising of currency conversion is much more unfavourable from the perspective of financing institutions, as pointed out by KNF as well (Ocena wpływu…
2013):
 Pursuant to the KNF data, the cost of redemption of 50% of the principal amount referred to earlier would cost at least PLN 40-50 bn 3 -MPs intended to transfer this loss to the banks.
 Taking into account the different exposure of banks to foreign currency loans, it should be considered that the losses of particular banks would range from 0.1 to 7 billion PLN. These losses would virtually eliminate the banks' annual profits, significantly reducing their market value.
 The banking sector would lose nearly 30% of equity, resulting in a substantial restriction of financing availability, and in consequence would hinder the economic growth in Poland in the subsequent years. Additionally, three banks would lose their entire equity and would become insolvent.
 Taking into account the policy of ensuring stability of financing institutions, the state would have to nationalise the above-mentioned three banks and increase the capital and grant liquidity loans to a number of other financing institutions. Depending on the scale of actions undertaken, the multi-billion cost for the state budget would be involved.
To sum up this part of the paper, one must conclude that the currency conversion of even 50% of the principal loan amounts means decreasing the economic growth in Poland for several years, significant decrease in Polish banks' valuation and, in consequence, a stock market plunge, 4 as well as increase in the state deficit, particularly risky given the recently discontinued excessive deficit procedure Poland was subjected to.
If we consider assistance to CHF borrowers necessary (which is disputable), the proposal put forward by KNF is more realistic: according to experts, its cost over 20-25 years would equal PLN 25bn, corresponding to only several percent of banks' profits per year (Frank podskoczył, a szef KNF nadal przekonuje do swojej propozycji przewalutowania kredytów). Pursuant to this proposal, CHF loans would be split into two parts: a mortgage-backed loan (corresponding to the value of the CHF loan converted into PLN at the exchange rate of the date of the loan) and an unsecured loan (with the value corresponding to the difference between the current liability of the borrower and the mortgage-backed loan). The first of the loans would be repaid in PLN, substantially on the same terms as the loan before restructuring, while the second one would be extended by the bank to the client at the fixed 1% interest rate to be repaid over subsequent years.
This proposal would slightly reduce banks' profits and their valuation in the long-perspective, but the banks would avoid insolvency and significant loss of equity, leading to the restriction of financing availability and the decreased ratio of economic growth. Taking into account the actual decrease in the value of banks already discounted by the markets (see chart 4), one could argue that this proposal would be of substantial help to CHF borrowers, practically removing the currency risk in the CHF mortgage loans sector and without causing damage to the economy.
Chart 4. WIG-Banks index in the period: September 2014-August 2015
Source: http://stooq.pl/q/?s=wig_banki&c=1y&t=l&a=lg&b=0.
As show in chart 4, the commencement of the legislative process aimed at currency conversion of the loans significantly decreased the capitalisation of banks. In the period from May to the beginning of September 2015, WIG-Banks index fell from ca. 8,300 points to 6,300 points, that is by nearly 30%. Banks' share price fluctuations in the summer of 2015 (especially when compared to stable historic data) reflect the lack of stability and negative outlook prevailing among investors. One should note that the implementation of the most radical versions of loan currency conversion involves a significant risk that Poland would be charged with infringing foreign investors' interests (which is important in the context of high involvement of foreign entities in the Polish banking sector).
Conclusion
In author's view, the solutions concerning the loan conversion put forward by the parliament in August 2015 would have negative impact on the economy and would be unfair to consumers. First of all, legislator's proposals generate banks' loss to the amount of several dozen billion PLN to be paid immediately, resulting in several banks' insolvency. Secondly, the costs of saving the financial sector would force the state to exceed the three percent deficit cap for the public finance sector and would increase public debt up to the 60% threshold. Thirdly, it would significantly and permanently decrease the attractiveness and credibility of Poland to investors.
Fourthly, it treats borrowers unfairly, favouring one group of borrowers (CHF borrowers) at the expense of borrowers who have taken out loans in other currencies and citizens paying for the costs of saving the banks after the loans have been converted. The proposals involving spreading the loss over many years (including the discussed KNF proposal) mitigate most of the disadvantages inherent to the MPs proposal. However, one should bear in mind that, faced with potential changes to the EU case law on currency loans, it would be advisable to postpone rushed drafts on loan restructuring.
